Security Vulnerabilities in Software Defined Networking (SDN): A Survey and Classification

Abstract

Software Defined Networking (SDN) introduces programmability and flexibility into network management, separating the control and data planes to centralize network intelligence. While SDN offers numerous benefits such as dynamic policy enforcement, simplified configuration, and enhanced automation it also exposes novel attack surfaces not present in traditional networks. This paper provides a comprehensive survey of major threats facing SDN environments as of 2017, organizing them across the architectural layers: application, control, and data planes. Key vulnerabilities include flow table exhaustion, controller hijacking, inconsistent state propagation, and weak authentication in communication protocols like OpenFlow. Furthermore, the centralized nature of SDN controllers creates a single point of failure, making resiliency and trust establishment critical challenges. We analyze mitigation techniques including role based access control (RBAC), TLS
enforced secure channels, and distributed controller models. Real world case studies, such as OpenDaylight and Floodlight deployments, are discussed to contextualize theoretical risks with empirical evidence. Finally, we propose a layered security framework emphasizing defense in depth, anomaly detection, cryptographic protection, and architectural redundancy. This work aims to inform researchers, developers, and network operators by synthesizing known vulnerabilities and charting a path toward secure SDN architectures.